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MARKETS AND VULNERABLE PATIENTS: HEALTH LAW AFTER THE 2012 ACT 
In the popular imagination, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 is associated with a final 
‘dismantling of the NHS as we know it’, by bringing competition, markets, contracts, and 
private interests in to the NHS.1 The Bill’s turbulent journey through the Parliamentary 
process (more than 1000 amendments; over a year in debate; multiple attempts to block, 
stall or delay the Bill, up to the last minute) shows how controversial such a move was 
understood to be. This process also took place at a time when, in view of numerous 
inquiries, public trust in the ability of English healthcare institutions (in particular hospitals, 
but also nursing homes) to protect vulnerable patients against fundamental failures to 
provide compassionate care and treatment had been seriously undermined. 
The Act came into force on 1 April 2013. While doing so is reminiscent of Monty Python’s 
Summarise Proust Competition2, the key provisions can be summarised as follows. The 
Secretary of State for Health remains accountable to Parliament for health service 
provision,3 while many responsibilities historically located in the Department of Health are 
now placed on other bodies, such as Monitor, the NHS Commissioning Board (‘NHS 
England’), and around 200 ‘clinical commissioning groups’, integrating innovation through 15 
new Academic Health Science Networks. Monitor is the new health-specific economic 
regulator, and is responsible alongside the Office of Fair Trading, for ensuring that ‘qualified 
providers’4 of health services comply with competition law.5 Monitor will also regulate prices6 
and has a duty to work with commissioners to ensure continuity of care in the event that a 
                                                 
1
 See, for instance, Youssef El-Gingihy, ‘Health Act means the death of the NHS as we know it’ The 
Observer (London, 30 March 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/30/health-
act-means-death-of-nhs> accessed 13 March 2014 
2
 Monty Python Summarize Proust Competition (Youtube) 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uwAOc4g3K-g> accessed 13 March 2014 
3
 Health and Social Care Act 2012, s 1(3) 
4
 Licensed under Health and Social Care Act 2012, ss 81-114 
5Health and Social Care Act, ss 61-80 
6ibid, ss 115-127 
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provider exits the market.7 NHS England takes over from strategic health authorities and 
primary care trusts, both of which are abolished.8 Clinical commissioning groups,9 which are 
consortiums of GPs, and local authorities, will commission integrated health and social care 
services, through ‘Health and Wellbeing Boards’.10 These new bodies will control nearly 70% 
of the NHS budget for health services.11 Providers of health services must be licensed, but 
the policy of ‘any qualified provider’12 seeks to make it easier for third sector and private 
organisations to enter a market for NHS service provision.  
 
This special issue brings medical lawyers together with those with an interest in health as a 
case study, but who self-define as competition lawyers, EU lawyers, pharmaceutical and 
patent lawyers, comparative lawyers, bioethicists, empirical socio-legal scholars, or 
regulation specialists. We hope to make four, interconnected, contributions to health law 
scholarship, while also exploring how the post-2012 Act position affects or might affect 
vulnerable patients.  
First, using the 2012 Act as a springboard, we explore some of the dynamics between health 
understood as a social public good and health understood as a marketable commodity, and 
the implications of those meanings for vulnerable patients and health law scholarship. The 
view of health as a social public good is inherent in the classical approach of medical 
lawyers to questions of how the law can facilitate choices that might achieve high quality, 
patient-focused healthcare. For example, Christopher Newdick’s article argues that patients 
– particularly vulnerable patients – are ill-served by governance models based on choice and 
competition. The 2012 Act questions the assumption that competition, markets, contracts 
                                                 
7ibid, ss 98-99 
8ibid, s 9, sch 4. 
9ibid, ss 10, 13-14, 20, 24-28, 46, 75, sch 2 
10ibid, ss 193-199 
11
 __, ‘NHS Allocations for 2013/14’ (NHS England) <http://www.england.nhs.uk/allocations-2013-
14/> accessed 13 March 2014 
12
 __, ‘Any Qualified Provider’ (NHS Choices) <http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Yourchoices/any-
qualified-provider/Pages/aqp.aspx> accessed 13 March 2014 
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and private interests are detrimental to health law. Taken cumulatively, several articles in 
this issue challenge this classical approach to medical law. For example, Lindsay Stirton’s 
‘long view’ article calls into question any ‘easy solutions’ – such as those embodied by a 
notion of the ‘golden days’ of a pre-1990s NHS, governed through hierarchy – as being 
inherently preferable to markets.  
The 2012 Act is pushing the limits of acceptability in conceiving of NHS health services as a 
market, but commerciality and innovation are not necessarily a panacea for success. 
Shannon Gibson and Trudo Lemmens’ article highlights the critical importance of using the 
right regulatory tools at the right juncture if healthcare services are to meet increasing public 
demands for timely access to innovative drugs. In the face of an increasingly fragmented 
pharmaceutical industry – which is not alone in providing direct-to-consumer healthcare 
information, products and services – we must question our perceptions of healthcare 
providers. Sigrid Sterckx and Julian Cockbane’s article prompts consideration of whether the 
2012 Act presumes an archaic understanding of healthcare providers as both institution-
centred and nationally limited.  
Secondly, we seek to enhance a dialogue through which the ‘classical’ methodologies of 
medical law might be supplemented, or challenged, by the research questions and 
methodologies of those with another disciplinary focus. By including articles adopting 
methodologies inspired by comparative and EU law, we explore the lessons that England 
can learn from jurisdictions that have adopted similar reforms. We also use the 2012 Act to 
consider how the over-arching framework of European Union law interacts with national 
health law. Johan van de Gronden and Erika Szyszczak’s article shows how key concepts in 
competition law, such as the notion of an ‘undertaking’, ‘geographic market’, or ‘market 
failure’, are translated into the context of health law by national authorities. Far from EU 
competition law being a totalising force, driving European healthcare systems away from a 
patient-care focus, in some contexts legal categories can be – and have been – used to 
shield health providers from EU competition law, or to articulate arguments that resonate 
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with values expressed as promoting high quality, patient-focused healthcare. Written by a 
‘health lawyer who focuses on the right to health care’ and a ‘competition lawyer 
concentrating on health care’, André den Exter and Mary Guy’s article on the Netherlands 
exemplifies the benefits of such collaborative scholarship. Their conclusion is that blanket 
pronouncements about whether markets are ‘good’ for vulnerable patients are suspect: the 
context is what matters. However, they agree that marketised healthcare systems are 
unlikely to address health inequalities. 
Thirdly, the ethics-driven focus of medical law, and the perspective of those who seek to 
introduce greater competition into the NHS, must accommodate the interests of vulnerable 
patients. Everyone is vulnerable when relying on others for medical, health or social needs, 
but some groups are particularly vulnerable within this context. For instance, most of the 
excess deaths in the 14 hospitals in the Keogh review13 because of their outlying mortality 
statistics were older people who may have had complex conditions. The articles brought 
together here offer an opportunity to think about how the post-2012 Act environment might 
address failures of health services to provide the ideal of high quality, cost-effective care, 
centred on the vulnerable user. The articles by Newdick, Stirton, van de Gronden and 
Szyszczak, and den Exter and Guy all contribute to that debate.  
The ethical analysis is more directly exemplified within Gibson and Lemmens’ article, 
prompting consideration of the balance between the needs of individual healthcare 
improvements and the systemic cost-effectiveness of current regulatory structures. This is 
exacerbated in the UK by the need to regulate for quality and comparative efficacy. The turn 
to post-market regulation, and greater transparency, has been hampered, inter alia by legal 
arguments based on commercial interests being articulated as human rights. For Sterckx 
and Cockbane, in a healthcare system premised on trust, tensions between the altruism of 
patients/participants and the potential for commercialisation, the intention to harvest NHS 
                                                 
13
 Professor Sir Bruce Keogh, ‘Review into the Quality of Care and Treatment Provided by 14 Hospital 
Trusts in England; Overview Report’ (NHS England) p. 28 <http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/bruce-
keogh-review/Documents/outcomes/keogh-review-final-report.pdf> accessed 13 March 2014  
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patient data, and the questionable practices of some direct-to-consumer genetic testing 
companies show how we are all vulnerable to abuses. 
Finally, we seek to contribute to a debate about how the classical interests of medical law 
can be re-framed in this post-2012 Act environment. Nothing is more ‘classical’ for a medical 
lawyer than a clinical negligence claim, and Linda Mulcahy’s article discusses how the 
nature of clinical negligence has changed since the introduction of the NHS Litigation 
Authority, and considers how it will develop further in the post-2012 Act regime. Clinical 
negligence is increasingly seen as, and is performing as, a regulatory safety valve in its own 
right, especially in the context of information gathering about systemic failures. Mulcahy 
foresees a valuable role – albeit one controlled by the NHS – for negligence litigation to 
develop the law in the post-2012 Act regime. 
 
In addition to our four contributions to health law, we illuminate promising future research 
agendas. They focus around four topics. (a) The optimal blend between regulated markets 
and individual litigation to protect vulnerable patients. In its choice to introduce a limited opt-
out collective actions regime, the government has indicated that collective actions under the 
competition framework are a viable option for protecting vulnerable patients, especially those 
affected by competition scandals.14 It is worth considering whether a well-organised class 
action in competition will offer better protection than an individual claim in negligence. It will 
be important to explore the role that negligence actions play in the post-2012 Act regime, 
since there are clear indications that they are already performing the information gathering 
functions central to a regulatory regime. (b) The appropriate ways for scholars to analyse 
systemic failures in the provision of compassionate care. Human rights might be a useful 
lens for these purposes, since it is far from clear how the Mid-Staffs patient claiming a 
breach of Article 3 ECHR would fare before the European Court of Human Rights. 
                                                 
14
 See Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Private Actions in Competition Law: A 
Consultation for Options on Reform – Government Response (BIS/13/501, 2013)  
 7 
Alternatively, the law of negligence may be a more relevant framework, especially in the 
context of a health law grounded in tort. The main challenge here is articulating the nature of 
the harm in a way recognised by the law,15 and in a way such that issues which should be 
found to be negligent are not dismissed at the causation stage. (c) The appropriate use of 
confidential patient information, and whether that includes use not directly related to patient 
care. There is at least the potential for a claim under Article 8 ECHR, which bears 
exploration. (d) While competition law purports to have general application, it is worth 
exploring whether incorporating the traditional concerns of medical lawyers – the doctor-
patient relationship, patient autonomy, confidentiality, vulnerable patients – can make 
competition law richer and more coherent in its application in the health context.  
 
Ultimately, this special issue shows that we should reconsider the contrast between the 
assumption of competition law or market-based regulatory models that the greed and self-
serving behaviour of powerful actors has to be guarded against, in order to protect the 
vulnerable consumer; and the assumption of medical law that it protects the vulnerable 
through its roots in moral principles, traceable to the Hippocratic Oath and followed through 
its reformulations in the Declaration of Geneva, and articulated through compassion and 
trust. The Francis Reports16 put the assumption that healthcare in the NHS is guided by 
such compassion and trust on very shaky ground. This alone should be enough to suggest 
that health law has much to learn from continued collaborations with others. 
 
                                                 
15
 This may not always be a problem. Some of the patients at Mid-Staffs died as a result of neglect. 
16
 The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (HC 2012-13, 898 I-III) 
